Abstract
Introduction
Тhe words of the Iron Chancellor Otto von Bismarck are relevant even today: "Europe today is a powder keg and the leaders are like men smoking in an arsenal … A single spark will set off an explosion that will consume us all … I cannot tell you when that explosion will occur, but I can tell you where … Some damned foolish thing in the Balkans will set it off." (Navrozov 2008) . In the heart of Europe, instability in the Balkans entails dangerous spill-over effects into the Union in terms of organized crime, refugee flows and migratory pressures amongst others. Therefore, conflict prevention and conflict resolution in its neighbourhood constitute key external priorities of the European Union (EU).
Since the EU's approach to violent ethnic conflicts has been born and bred in the Balkans, this paper will attempt to compare the EU's experience in this region throughout time and in different contexts in order to assess the different mechanisms which the EU has employed in formulating the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and within the Enlargement Policy in the process of conflict prevention and conflict resolution. It covers the period from 1990 onwards, when the dissolution of the former Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) began. It will focus on the European Community's (EC) and afterwards the EU's role in the conflicts in former Yugoslavia in the period when the CFSP was created. The paper will then assess the EU's involvement in conflict prevention and conflict resolution in the Balkans after the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) was launched in 1999. It shows that the EU changed its role in the region due to the fact that the newly formed independent republics existing in a completely different political context ten years later, have greater incentive to become EU member states and be part of the EU market, but also due to the fact that the EU was equipped with several mechanisms that made it more effective when it came to the institutional shortcomings of the past with the Amsterdam Treaty which entered into force in 1999, and afterwards with the Lisbon Treaty entering into force in
2009.
issues at the very beginning of creating its CFSP and in a period when the region was not part of the enlargement process, the EC and EU afterwards proved to be extremely ineffective. The lack of unity among member states on the issues connected to the conflicts in SFRY also contributed towards the ineffectiveness of EC/EU actions. Moreover, without the proper mechanisms to act, the leverage of the EC and afterwards the EU had little impact on the process of resolving the crisis. The EC/EU was unable to use its enlargement policy in the case of former Yugoslavia also because of the fact that the country had no interest in becoming an EC member state and neither did its republics. In the second part, through three case studies, the paper will show that with the combined use of CFSP mechanisms and SAP, positive examples of the EU acting as a provider of peaceful dispute settlement in the Western Balkans are established.
Under the changed circumstances ten years later and in a different context in the Balkans, using its conditionality policy and the 'proverbial carrot' of candidate status, the EU was instrumental in brokering the However, the main factor that led to this conflict was the fact that the borders of the republics did not correspond to the distribution of the various nationalities within the SFRY that also suffered from deep-seated historic antagonisms. The presence of a significant Serbian minority in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Croatian minority in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and moreover, the Serbian policy to establish a 'greater Serbia' by annexing Serbian-populated territory from within Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was the other factor that contributed to the lengthy multi-ethnic conflicts (Brsakoska Bazerkoska 2016 crisis (Gligorov 2000) . The EC membership was not a priority for the leaders of the Yugoslav republics at that time, when heated nationalistic rhetoric was ongoing. In June 1991, Slovenian and Croatian unilateral acts of independence were passed. This only further escalated tensions.
After a number of unsuccessful attempts and appeals to maintain peace (EC 1991c; 1991d; 1991e 
Slovenia and Croatia only (EC 1992a). Bosnia and Herzegovina was
recognized as an independent state by the EC on 6 April 1992 (EC 1992b).
As Shaw suggested, the recognition of Croatia and Bosnia represented a clear example of premature recognition due to the fact that neither country had effective control of its territory -Croatia did not control onethird of its territory, and before the signing of the Dayton peace agreement Bosnia did not control almost 70 per cent of its territory (Shaw 1997) .
Under intense pressure from Germany, the EC and its member states recognised Croatia and Slovenia as independent states. By doing so, they partly ignored the opinion issued from its own Arbitration Commission that Macedonia and Slovenia were the only two republics that met all the criteria to be recognised as new states. According to Blockmans (2014) , "the political impact of these measures on the dissolution and the war in Yugoslavia was significant, because it isolated and punished the Serb/Montenegrin-dominated federal authorities and it also ended the European stewardship of the international efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the conflict, due to Serbia's distrust of the EC as a mediator."
EU role after 1995 -a need for a stronger US presence
It became evident that the positions of the key European states were dominating the situation rather than there being a unified joint response.
In particular, this refers to the German Christmas recognition of Slovenia and Croatia which by-passed the Arbitration Commission mechanism. It could be concluded that the EC policy in respect to the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis could be determined by the following factors: a lack of mechanisms for a joint European response; an inclination of domination of a few European countries in particular Germany; and finally, the EC/EU membership not being an incentive for the newly-formed states.
For that reason, the US decided to make an effort to end the war raging through the territory of the former SFRY. In November 1995 in Dayton, after four years of war and numerous atrocities, the peace initiative that was undertaken by the United States supported by the UN Security Council and the Contact Group, finally resulted in a ceasefire agreement.
Being unable to deal with the conflicts in its backyard was seen as a failure for the EU. Although it was freshly equipped with the Common Foreign and Security Policy and having confidence that "the hour of Europe has dawned" 5 (Gligorov 2000) , the EU was incapable of stopping the brutal breakdown of former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s (Blockmans 2014 ).
Since the EU was unable to put in effect the newly defined CFSP to deal with the war in Yugoslavia, it prompted the EU leaders to rethink the mechanisms in the treaties, in order to strongly engage the EU in at the end of the 1990s in Kosovo. The conflict in Kosovo and its struggle for self-rule began in 1998. However, it was too soon for all the novelties introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam to be put into action especially given the violence of the conflict. Therefore, the EU once again needed US assistance in the resolution of the conflict. The conflict ended one year later with the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Kosovo.
Once the war in former Yugoslavia was over, the EU was presented with a new opportunity in the Balkans. The political landscape in the Balkans had changed -the new states which did not rely on the large market of 
The EU's second chance in the Balkans
Introducing the SAP -the additional tool for conflict prevention and conflict resolution?
In view of the EU's acknowledged failure to deal with the unfolding tragedy of Yugoslavia's disintegration in the 1990s, the EU was determined to contribute to the stabilization of the region and to restore external credibility in the Balkans, which had been lost during the wars in the ex-Yugoslav republics. The success in the Western Balkans was long perceived as a test for the effectiveness of EU foreign policy. Therefore, the EU designed the process of Stabilization and Association especially for the Western Balkan countries. It was tailored in a manner to be suitable for the process of postcommunist transition, post-war reconciliation and EU integration.
In 1993 There is one more lesson I take from the Balkans today: never, never, never give up. Because what is happening in this region today shows how it is possible to turn failed states into successful states, how it is possible to fashion hope out of despair, how it is possible to make a difference. We have a long way to go in the Balkans: but we are getting there." Therefore, the EU conditionality policy in the Balkans was designed as a multi-dimensional instrument directed towards reconciliation, reconstruction and reform. In addition to the 1993 Copenhagen criteria, the Western Balkans countries are expected to meet additional criteria that are country-specific and mainly linked to different peace agreements; 6 the promotion of regional cooperation and reconciliation is also expected.
The 'proverbial carrot' of future membership in the EU gives the muchneeded efficiency to the SAP. By using both positive conditionality entailing the promise of a certain benefit in return for the fulfilment of a predetermined condition, or negative conditionality involving the infliction of a punishment or sanction in the event a specified obligation was violated (the EU has the option to freeze the financial assets for that country when it fails to meet the objectives) the conditionality policy within the Western Balkan countries has been used very effectively in the process of conflict prevention and conflict resolution. In the three cases that will be elaborated below, both the EU's Special Representatives its role in the process of brokering an agreement on normalizing the relations between Serbia and Kosovo.
The conflict in the Republic of Macedonia
The first country to conclude the Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2001 was the Republic of Macedonia. It was also the third republic of the former SFRY to achieve candidate status. 7 According to Michael Sahlin From that point, besides the essential Copenhagen criteria, the Ohrid Framework Agreement became another tool of measuring the progress that the country makes towards fulfilling the conditions for EU membership, and it was a very important one. For the EU, it was important to achieve success in the Balkans, where it had historically been mainly passive. 
9
This is a description of the country which is given in the Progress Report by the European Commission. It is supposed to designate a state where there is a long-lasting bifurcation of state and the party.
independence was an unwelcome development because the EU was not ready to deal with Kosovo and a new federal state could provide a framework for the reintegration of Kosovo. According to Tocci (ibid.) , the EU would take its own decision (Koeth 2010: 227-247) . He was backed by the then Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn who was stating that "Kosovo is a profoundly European matter" (Rehn 2007) .
By the beginning of 2008, it was more than apparent that the authorities in Pristina would declare independence. This fact divided the EU, especially since five of its member states 10 announced that they would never recognize Kosovo's independence without a new UNSC Resolution. The EU's answer to the forthcoming unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo was to accelerate the deployment of the mission before the independence, so EULEX would not become involved in a following row over the non-recognition (Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012: 746-763 
Conclusions
Regarding the more difficult security issues, the EU's approach in dealing with them is often perceived as weak. This was once again proven in the case of the conflicts that raged in the Balkans in the past two decades.
The war in former Yugoslavia was one of the greatest failures of the EC/ EU diplomacy and can be contributed to several factors -lack of suitable mechanisms for conflict prevention and conflict resolution, lack of alertness, lack of institutional capacity when it comes to the EU institutions, as well as the lack of the appeal of the EU membership at that point in time for the Yugoslav republics and the lack of consent of the parties to be mediated by the EU. The EU was faced with the dissolution of SFRY at the inception of its existence at the beginning of the 1990s. The CFSP mechanisms were just starting to build and grow, and the prospect of future EU membership was not as tempting and important as for today's independent republics.
In any case, the EU's efforts were strengthened throughout the years. with several mechanisms that made it more effective when it came to the institutional shortcomings of the past. Therefore, the EU-facilitated dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo stands out as a success. It is both the outcome and also the characteristics of the diplomatic process itself that led to the successful Brussels Agreement in 2013. It was a high-level and high-paced diplomatic process. The facilitated dialogue showed that the EU could use the prospect of closer relations as a powerfull tool to convince third parties to settle their disputes peacefully.
Finally, the EU still needs to tackle one issue that makes conflict prevention and conflict resolution more time-consuming and sometimes unsuccessful:
the lack of unity among member states on how a strategy to tackle and resolve disputes on the borders of the EU should be defined. It is difficult to have a strategy for conflict prevention and conflict resolution abroad when the EU is divided. When the big countries pursue their own interests and the smaller member states block decisions in order to draw attention to their own concerns, the EU can achieve little. One of the reasons for the high-profile failures of EU peace diplomacy during the break-off of the former Yugoslav Federation was the disunity of the member states. 
